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In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Bitkoff argued that the district court erred when it 
partially denied his motion for credit for time served. This brief is necessary to address 
several of the State's arguments, including but not limited to, its assertion that 
Mr. Bitkoff was not served with an Idaho bench warrant on December 29, 2011, and its 
argument that the "for the offense" limitation contained in I.C. § 18-309, the statute 
which controls pre-judgment credit for time served, should be applied to Mr. Bitkoff's 
request for post-judgment credit for time served. Mr. Bitkoff argues that the record 
clearly indicates that on December 29, 2011, he was served and arrested in this matter 
"on Idaho Warrant # CR20092472C." Additionally, the "for the offense" limitation 
contained in I. C. § 18-309 is not applicable when a defendant requests credit for periods 
of post-judgment time served, because the statute which controls credit for post-
judgment time served, I.C. § 19-2603, does not contain I.C. § 18-309's "for the offense" 
limitation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Bitkoff's Appellant's Brief. As such, they need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, 
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bitkoff credit for time served, as I.C. § 19-
2603 requires a district court to award credit for time served from the date a bench 
warrant is served for a probation violation? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I. C.§ 19-2603 Requires A District Court To Award Credit For Time Served From The 
Date A Bench Warrant Is Served For A Probation Violation 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Mr. Bitkoff provided no evidence 
in support of his assertion that he was served with an Idaho bench warrant in this matter 
on December 29, 2011, as Idaho authorities served him with a bench warrant on 
February 5, 2013. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-1 0.) The State then cites to pages 200-
205 of the Clerk's Record on Appeal 1 for the proposition that the Nevada probation 
authorities were only aware of the Idaho bench warrant, but those authorities did not 
setVe Mr. Bitkoff with that warrant. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6, 8.) 
This is a mischaracterization of the record. In support of his motion for credit for 
time served, Mr. Bitkoff wrote an affidavit stating that on December 29, 2011, he was 
served with a bench warrant signed by Judge Mclaughlin.2 (R., pp.197-198.) 
Additionally, two exhibits were attached to that motion, and they are located between 
pages 200 and 205 of the Clerk's Record on Appeal. (R., pp.200-205.) The first exhibit, 
contains a series of chronological notes (hereinafter, C-notes). (R., pp.201-204.) These 
C-notes contain communications between the Idaho probation authorities and the 
Nevada probation authorities. (R., pp.201-204.) There are multiple entries in the C-
Notes. (R, p.201.) The first entry is from November 29, 2011, wherein the Nevada 
1 As mentioned in the Appellant's Brief (Appellant's Brief, p.1 n.1 ), there are two Clerk's 
Records on Appeal and two Presentence Investigations. Since they both relate to the 
same underlying criminal action, the Clerk's Records and Presentence Investigations 
are virtually identical. For ease of citation, all of the citations, in this brief, will be to the 
Clerk's Record and Presentence Investigation in Docket Number 40125. 
2 This case was subsequently reassigned to Judge Neville after Judge Mclaughlin 
issued the bench warrant. 
3 
authorities indicate that they were aware of "a nationwide listed on NCIC" for 
Mr. Bitkoff. (R., p.201.) The second entry is from 2011, and it indicates 
that the Nevada authorities were informed of Idaho's "active Warrant #0902472C Prob 
Viol."3 (R., p.201.) The next entry in the C-notes is from January 3, 2012, and it states, 
"The subject was arrested 12/29/2011 on your warrant and other charges." (R., p.202.) 
That same entry also states, "The S was contacted at the above residence on 
12/29/2011, and arrested on Idaho Warrant # CR20092472C, additionally he was 
booked on a N. Las Vegas Warrant ... Thx for being patient, I will keep you updated." 
(R., p.202.) The foregoing entry, indicating that Mr. Bitkoff was arrested on the Idaho 
warrant number CR-2009-2472-C, is repeated on page 203 of the Clerk's Record. 
(R., p.203.) As such, the record clearly indicates that on December 29, 2011, 
Mr. Bitkoff was served with the bench warrant issued by Judge Mclaughlin, and the 
State's assertion to the contrary is belied by the record. 
The State next argues that the holding from State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673 
(Ct. App. 2013), undermines Mr. Bitkoff's request for credit for time served. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-9.) In that case, Kesling was on probation in Idaho and, 
through an interstate compact, his probation was transferred to Florida. /d. at 675. 
While in Florida, Kesling was convicted and sentenced for five new felonies. /d. Since 
the new convictions violated the terms Kesling's Idaho probation agreement, bench 
warrants were issued by the Idaho court. /d. Kesling was eventually extradited to Idaho 
3 It should be noted that warrant number, "09024 72C," correlates with the district court's 
case number in this matter which is CR-2009-2472-C. (R., p.1.) Therefore, there can 
be no dispute about the fact that the Nevada probation authorities and the Idaho 
probation authorities were discussing the bench warrant issued by Judge Mclaughlin in 
this matter. (R., pp.158-159.) 
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his probation was revoked. /d. Kesling then moved for credit for time for 
period of time he was in custody in Florida. /d. 
Kesling argued that he was entitled to credit for time served because he "'was 
being held on [an Idaho] detainer warrant' which prohibited his release after he 
completed his Florida sentences." /d. at 678. The Court of Appeals held that Kesling's 
motion for credit for time served was without merit because he "presented no evidence 
showing the contents of the communications between the Idaho and Florida authorities 
and no evidence that he was held in Florida beyond the end of his Florida sentences." 
!d. at 679. 
The State argues that this holding somehow undermines Mr. Bitkoffs request for 
credit for time served. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-9.) The State's reliance on Kesling is 
misplaced because Mr. Bitkoff provided the very type of evidence in support of his 
motion for credit for time served that Kesling failed to provide. As mentioned above, 
Mr. Bitkoff supported his motion for credit for time served with the communications 
between Idaho and Nevada authorities. (R., pp.200-204.) In those communications, 
the Nevada authorities informed the Idaho authorities that they arrested Mr. Bitkoff on 
"your warrant," which is "Idaho Warrant # CR20092472C." (R., p.203.) As such, 
Kesling actually supports Mr. Bitkoff's claim of error because Mr. Bitkoff provided the 
very information the Court of Appeals held was necessary for Kesling to establish his 
appellate claim for credit for time served. 
The State next argues that Mr. Bitkoff should not be awarded credit for time 
served because he was incarcerated in Nevada for convictions from that state and he 
should not be entitled to double credit for time served. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.) 
5 
In support of this position, the State points to I.C. § 18-309, the statute which controls 
pre-judgment credit for time served, and argues that "the legal principle it that 
a defendant is only entitled to credit 'for the offense or an included offense,' is still 
relevant to the court's application of Idaho Code § 19-2603." (Respondent's Brief, p.7 
(State's emphasis).) The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously rejected a virtually 
identical argument in State v. Odom, 2011 Unpublished Opinion4 No.364 (Ct. App. Feb. 
17, 2011).5 In that case, Odom was on probation in Idaho in three separate criminal 
cases. /d. at 2. On March 7, 2006, Odom was arrested in Louisiana, by Louisiana 
authorities, for committing a new offense in that state. /d. At the time he was arrested 
in Louisiana, Odom was also served with Idaho arrest warrants for probation violations. 
/d. Odom was eventually convicted and sentenced for his new offense in Louisiana. /d. 
For some reason, which was unclear from the record, Odom was paroled in Louisiana 
on December 5, 2006, but not extradited to Idaho. /d. at 2-3. Idaho authorities 
eventually learned that Odom was on parole in Louisiana and they re-issued the arrest 
warrants. /d. Odom was re-arrested for the new Idaho warrants on April 23, 2007, and 
4 Mr. Bitkoff recognizes that this is an unpublished opinion and is not to be cited as 
authority because it is neither case law nor binding precedent. See Internal Rule Of 
The Idaho Supreme Court 15(f) ("If an opinion is not published, it may not be cited as 
authority or precedent in any court."). Accordingly, Mr. Bitkoff is only citing to this case 
as an example of how the Idaho Court of Appeals has dealt with this argument in the 
~a st. 
State v. Odom involved a consolidated appeal from six separate district court cases 
bearing the docket numbers 36951, 36952, 36953, 36957, 36958, and 36959. 
Additionally, three of the appeals involved post-conviction petitions filed pursuant to the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act, I.C. § 19-4901, et seq, and are entitled 
Odom v. State. For ease of citation, however, the Odom Opinion will be referred to as 
State v. Odom in this brief. Additionally, the Odom Opinion is attached as Appendix A. 
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was extradited to Idaho on May 7, 2007. /d. at 3. Upon his return to Idaho, Odorn's 
was revoked in each case. /d. 
Odom then filed three motions for credit for time served and three post-conviction 
petitions alleging that he was entitled to credit for time served from the date he was first 
arrested in Louisiana and served with the Idaho arrest warrants, March 7, 2006. /d. 
The district court denied Odom's motion, in part, based on the "for the offense" limitation 
contained in I. C. § 18-309, "concluding that 'Odom cannot show that his incarceration in 
Louisiana was a consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which he 
was sentenced in [the Idaho cases]."' /d. at 3-4. "The court did, however, grant Odom 
credit for time served from the time that he was rearrested on the second Idaho warrant 
on April 23, 2007, to May 7, 2007, when he was extradited back to Idaho." /d. at 4.) 
On appeal, Odom argued, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603, that he was entitled to 
credit for time served from the date he received service of the Idaho arrest warrants, 
March 7, 2006, to the date he was released on parole, December 5, 2006. /d. at 5-6. In 
support of this assertion, Odom argued that the district court erred when it relied on the 
"for the offense" limitation contained in I. C. § 18-309 in its application of I. C. § 19-2603. 
/d. at 6. The Court of Appeals agreed with Odom and held that the district court erred 
when it applied the "for the offense" limitation contained in I.C. § 18-309 to Odom's 
request for credit for time served, because periods of post-judgment credit for time 
served are controlled by I.C. § 19-2603, and that statute does not contain the "for the 
offense" limitation. !d. at 4-6. As such, the Court of Appeals has previously rejected, 
7 
out of deference to the Idaho legislature6 (Opinion, p.6 n.2), the assertion that 
the "for the offense" limitation contained in I.C. § 18-309 should be used when applying 
I.C. § 19-2603. For the same reason, the State's assertion that 'for the offense or an 
included offense,' is still relevant to the court's application of Idaho Code § 19-2603," 
should be rejected in this case as well. (Respondent's Brief, p.7 (State's emphasis).) 
In sum, Mr. Bitkoff was served with an Idaho bench warrant in this matter on 
December 29, 2011, and he is entitled to credit for time served from that date. The 
State's assertion that Mr. Bitkoff did not establish this fact is clearly belied by the record. 
Moreover, it is irrelevant that Mr. Bitkoff was also arrested for new charges in Nevada at 
the same time was served with the Idaho bench warrant, because the "for the 
offense" limitation contained in I.C. § 18-309 is not contained in the statute which 
controls credit for post-judgment periods of incarceration, I. C. § 19-2603. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bitkoff respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
denying him credit for time served and remand this case to the district court for an order 
granting him proper credit for time served pursuant to I. C. § 19-2603. 
DATED this 181h day of June, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
6 This is consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that Idaho courts do not 
have the power to modify unambiguous statutes. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 894-896 (2011) (holding that Idaho courts cannot 
engage in statutory construction when dealing with unambiguous statutes or, in other 
words, modify or void unambiguous statutes, because the power to do so is legislative 
not judicial). 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 
Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. Hon. G. Richard Bevan, 
District Judge. 
Order of the district court denying motion for credit for time served in Docket 
Nos. 36951, 36952, and 36953 and order of the district court summarily 
dismissing applications for post-conviction relief in Docket Nos. 36957, 36958, 
and 36959, vacated and remanded. 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Sara B. Thomas, Chief, 
Appellate Unit, Boise, for appellant. Shawn F. Wilkerson argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued. 
GRATTON, Chief Judge 
In these consolidated cases, John Ivan Odom appeals from the criminal court's order 
denying his motion for credit for time served in Docket Nos. 36951, 36952, and 36953, and from 
post-conviction court's order summarily dismissing his applications for post~conviction relief 
in Docket 36957, 36958, and 36959. 
I. 
FACTS 
In 2002 Odom pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, in three separate cases. In 
Docket No. 36951, he pled guilty to three counts of issuing a check without funds and one count 
of grand theft. In Docket No. 36952, he pled guilty to one count of issuing a check without 
funds. In Docket No. 36953, he pled guilty to one count of issuing a check without funds. In 
Docket No. 36951, the district court imposed determinate sentences of three years for each of the 
issuing a check without funds charges, and a unified sentence of ten years, with five years 
determinate, on the grand theft charge, with all the sentences to be served concurrently. In 
Docket No. 36952, the district court imposed a sentence of three years determinate to be served 
consecutively to the sentences in Docket Nos. 36951 and 36953. In Docket No. 36953, the 
district court also imposed a sentence of three years determinate to be served consecutively to the 
sentences in Docket Nos. 36951 and 36952. The district court retained jurisdiction in each case, 
ultimately placing Odom on probation in all three cases. 
With respect to the criminal case, the district court set forth the undisputed facts as 
follows: 
Multiple probation violations were filed against Odom in the above-
entitled cases between June of 2005 and October of 2005. Before the 2005 
violations could be addressed, a fifth probation violation report was filed on 
January 10, 2006. The Court issued a warrant ("the Idaho probation violation 
warrant") for Odom's arrest. 
On March 7, 2006, Odom was arrested in Louisiana by Louisiana 
authorities for violation of a Louisiana felony crime known as "Misapplication of 
Payment by Contracts." At the time of his arrest on that charge, Louisiana 
officers also served the Idaho probation violation warrant(s) on Odom. An 
extradition hearing was held in Louisiana on March 13, 2006, and Odom waived 
extradition to Idaho. However he continued to be held in Louisiana pending 
resolution of the Louisiana charge. Ultimately Odom pled guilty to the Louisiana 
felony and on June 19, 2006 was sentenced to 18 months in prison in Louisiana. 
He was in the custody of Louisiana on Louisiana's charges from the time of his 
arrest on March 7, 2006 through sentencing on June 19, 2006. 
Odom was discharged on parole from the Louisiana Penitentiary on 
December 5, 2006. He was in custody on the Louisiana charge until December 5. 
Following his release on parole he was not immediately extradited to Idaho 
pursuant to the Idaho an·est warrant that had been served in March 2006. It is not 
2 
entirely clear in th<~ record why Louisiana released Odom from all custody and 
failed to honor Idaho's probation warrant even though Odom had waived 
extradition on that warrant in March of 2006. Nevertheless after becoming aware 
of this Idaho reissued another probation violation warrant. Odom, who had been 
out of custody since December 5, 2006 was arrested on the new warrant on 
April23, 2007 and was extradited to Twin Falls on May 7, 2007. 
Upon returning to Idaho, the State filed more probation violations, and Odom admitted that he 
violated his probation by: (1) failing to pay restitution; (2) violating the law with respect to the 
Louisiana charges, as well as by driving without privileges; (3) having a checking account 
without prior authorization; and (4) absconding. The remaining allegations, including all 
previous probation violations that had been filed, were dismissed. The district court revoked 
Odom's probation and executed his prior sentences in all three cases. In each of the orders of 
commitment, the district court ordered that Odom "be given credit for any time served locally in 
this case and any time served previously with the Department of Corrections in this case." 
Odom did not appeal. 
On July 18, 2008, Odom filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief addressing 
all three of his convictions, and the post-conviction court appointed counsel. In his application, 
Odom asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "appl[y] for the credit for all 
time incarcerated while under the agents [sic] wanant, a total of Eleven (ll) months." The State 
filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal. Thereafter, Odom filed an amended 
application for post-conviction relief, in which he "requested that the credit for the time served in 
custody in Louisiana be considered appropriate for credit for time served in the instant matter," 
and also alleged that counsel should have "made a specific request for credit from the Louisiana 
incarceration time to be credited to him as part of the agreement." 
The post-conviction court conducted a status hearing, during which the State asserted that 
"the credit for time served matter is something that's not within the post-conviction relief 
statute." The post-conviction court indicated that it would prefer for the criminal court to "deal 
with the credit for time served matter." Odom did not object, and the post-conviction court 
subsequently issued an order indicating that Odom's motions for credit for time served would be 
"presented and determined by the Honorable Randy J. Stoker in Mr. Odom's criminal cases." 
Thereafter, Odom filed a motion in the criminal court for credit for time served based 
upon "the fact that his Louisiana matters became part of the probation violations in the above-
3 
entitled matters." The criminal court denied Odom's motion, concluding that "Odom cannot 
show that his incarceration in Louisiana was a consequence of or attributable to the charge or 
conduct for which he was sentenced in [the Idaho cases]." The court did, however, grant Odom 
credit for time served from the time that he was rearrested on the second Idaho warrant on 
April23, 2007, to May 7, 2007, when he was extradited back to Idaho. 
Following the criminal court's ruling, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed 
Odom's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue for credit for time served. The 
court noted that Odom's post-conviction counsel presented a request for credit for time served. 
The court concluded that the criminal court's ruling on the issue "essentially makes this claim 
moot" as Odom "received consideration by the sentencing court of his request for this credit." 
Because of the criminal court's mling, the post-conviction court determined that Odom could not 
show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
results ofthe proceeding would have been different." 
Odom appeals from the criminal court's denial of his motion for credit for time served 
and from the post-conviction court's order summarily dismissing his post-conviction application. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Odom contends that he is entitled, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2603, to credit for the 
post-judgment incarceration he served in Louisiana after the service of the Idaho bench warrant. 
He argues that the district court erred when it relied solely upon LC. § 18-309 in applying the 
"for the offense" limitation in denying his request for credit for time served, because I.C. § 19-
2603, which does not include the "for the offense" limitation, governs a request for credit for 
time served post-judgment following service of a bench warrant for a probation violation. 1 We 
agree. 
While Odom essentially makes the same argument in the post-conviction cases in the 
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we need not address that issue as we can 
simply rule on the merits. We recognize that the post-conviction claim was made in anticipation 
of an argument that the motion was not properly considered by the criminal court pursuant to 
State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 218 P.3d 1143 (2009). However, both parties agree that 
Odom's claim that he is entitled to credit for time served is properly before this Court. As such, 
we will address only that question on appeal. 
4 
Whether the district court properly applied the law governing credit for time served is a 
question of law over which we exercise . State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 
P.3d771, (Ct. App. 2006). We defer to the trial court's findings of fact, however, unless 
those findings are unsuppmtcd by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are 
therefore clearly erroneous. State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 
2003). 
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State 
v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 
(1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 
Idaho 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). 
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 
language of the statute is to be given its 
Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If 
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative 
history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this 
Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and 
give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To ascertain the intent of 
the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of 
those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. !d. It is incumbent 
upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 
135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). Constructions of a statute that would 
lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 
(2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). 
By its language, I. C. § 19-2603 clearly applies to the facts of this case. That provision, 
which addresses credit for time served post-judgment in cases involving probation violations, 
states: 
When the defendant is brought before the court in such case, it may, if judgment 
has been withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have 
pronounced, or, if judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, the 
original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be executed according 
to law, and the time such person shall have been at large under such suspended 
sentence shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence, but the time of 
5 
the defendant's sentence shall count from the date r~f service of such bench 
warrant. 
(Emphasis added.) We have previously stated that LC. § 18-309, the provision relied upon by 
the district court, "docs not directly address the question of credit for time served after an entry 
ofjudgment for defendants, who ... have been placed on probation but ultimately have had their 
probation revoked." State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280, 954 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(emphasis in original). In Lively, we reiterated that "I. C. § 19-2603 specifies that if a probationer 
has been atTested for a probation violation and the probation has been revoked as a result of the 
violation, the defendant's incarceration from the time of service of the bench warrant will count 
as part ofthe sentence." Lively, 131 Idaho at 280, 954 P.2d at 1076. 
Odom argues that he is entitled to credit for time served in Louisiana from March 7, 
2006, the date of the service of the Idaho bench warrant, until he was released from incarceration 
on the Louisiana charges and placed on parole on 5, 2006. The State counters that 
Odom is not entitled to credit on his Idaho sentences for the time he was incarcerated in 
Louisiana because he was never effectively in custody on that warrant. The State asserts that the 
statute presupposes that when a warrant is served, the defendant is taken into custody and 
incarcerated on that warrant. Here, however, Odom was arrested on Louisiana charges, served 
the Idaho bench warrant, and incarcerated in Louisiana. After service of the Idaho bench 
warrant, extradition proceedings to Idaho ensued, though Odom remained incarcerated m 
Louisiana. The Idaho bench warrant was never revoked while Odom was in custody m 
Louisiana. Based upon the plain language of I. C. § 19-2603, a defendant is entitled to credit for 
time served from the time of service of the bench warrant, and the district court erred in 
concluding otherwise. 2 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Odom is entitled to credit for time served from March 7, 2006, until December 5, 2006. 
The order of the district court denying motion for credit for time served in Docket Nos. 36951, 
2 We acknowledge that the legislature may not have intended a defendant to receive credit 
in Idaho for time served while incarcerated in another jurisdiction from the time of the service of 
an Idaho bench warrant. Nevertheless, it is not this Court's prerogative to alter the language of 
the statute. As such, we are bound to apply the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. 
6 
36952, and 36953 and the order of the district court summarily dismissing applications for post-
conviction relief in Docket Nos. 36957, and 36959 and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON 
7 
